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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

SPANISH FORK WEST FIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,

~~ES,

t

I

C
N
ase o.
8994

THE UNITED ST
a Nation, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
AND RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is the second time that this case has been before this
Court on appeail. Heretofore the defendants, United States,
a Nation, the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of
Reclamation of the United States, pursuant to Rule 72 (b),
sought to have this Court direct the dismissal of this action
upon the ground that the Court below, where the action was
.1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pending, was without jurisdiction of either the .United· States
or. the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of Reclamation of the United States, and that each of them is an indispensable party to this action. This Court denied the relief
sought in such appeal. The same parties on this appeal are
seeking identically the same relief that they unsuccessfully
sought in the former proceeding before this Court. In the main
the other facts recited in the Brief filed on behalf of the
United States and its Interior Secretary and Commissioner -of
Reclamation are correct, but the Respondents and CrossAppellants are not in agreement with the inference which
said Appellants seek to draw from such facts, nor with the
contention as to the law applicable thereto.

ARGUMENT
The Respondents contend:
POINT I
THAT THE APPELLANTS, UNITED STATES AND
ITS SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND COMMISSIONER
OF RECLAMATION ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION
OF THIS COURT WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THEY
WERE DENIED THE RIGHT TO HAVE THIS ACTION
DISMISSED BECAUSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The doctrine of Res Judicata, The Law of the Case and
Estoppel by a judgment alike require that there be an end to
litigation; that when a party has had an opportunity to litigate
a matter he should not be permitted to litigate it again to
the harassment and vexation of his opponent. 30 Am. fur.,
2
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Sec. 165 to 170, both inclusive, pages 911 ·to 914, ·and cases
cited in the footnotes. It will be seen from the text and the
cases cited in the footnotes that:
"the doctrine of the 'law of th~ case' is akin to that
of former ad judicati6n, but is more limited in the application. It relates entirely to questions of law and
is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings
in the same case."
See also: Black's Law Dictionary, Th~t·d Edition, page
1076, and cases there cited. Among such cases is Grow v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 Pac. 670.
It will be noted from the cases there cited that when the
"Law of the Case" is applicable to a particular proceeding,
it is binding alike on the trial court and the appellate court
in any further steps or proceedings in the same litigation.
While, as we recall, no written opinion was rendered by this
Court when this case was before it in the former proceeding,
such fact does not detract from the effect of the decision.
Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, page 1347; Nampa
Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 355, 64
L. Ed. 310, 40 Sup. Ct. Reports 74, where there is cited in
support of the conclusion reached the cases of Calaf v. Calaf,
232 U.S. 371; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S.
294, 299. It should be noted that the evidence received at the
trial of this case does not add anything touching the matter
of the jurisdiction of defendant, United States, and its Secretary
of Interior and Commissioner of Reclamation, that was not
apparent in the record before this Court at the time of the

former proceeding.
.3
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In the event the Court should conclude that it may again
review the question of whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction of the United States and its Secretary of Interior
and Commissioner of Reclamation we shall again direct the
attention of the Court to the authorities which support the
conclusions that the court below had jurisdiction over such
defendants.
It will be noted from the index to the Brief filed on behalf
of the Unietd States and its Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of Reclamation that more than fifty cases are cited,
and in the cases so cited there are probably an equal number ·
of other cases cited. We shall not attempt an analysis of all
of such cases. Many of the cited cases support doctrines that
are so elementary that no useful·purpose will be served by a
discussion of the same. Thus such cases as In Re Bear River
Drainage Area, 2 Utah (2d) 208, 271 Pac. (2d) 846; United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584; United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 496; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382; Belnap v.
Schela, 161 U. S. 10; and other cases cited support the view
that the United States may not be sued without its consent.
Needless to say, we do not contend to the contrary.

It is also urged that the Federal and State governments
are divided into three departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. See Brief of United States and its officers,
pages 30 to 35. If the numerous cases there cited are for the
purpose of convincing this Court that neither it nor the trial
cou~t may properly exercise legislative functions, it would
seem obvious that Counsel have needlessly devoted considerable effort in their search for cases which support a doctrine
.4
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with which the members of this Coqrt and the court below
are, and ever since they were in the grade school, have been
familiar. We have read the cases above referred to, but as we
read them, they shed little, if any, light on the questions
here presented. In our view, as we shall presently point out,
the errors committed by the trial court are in the improper
construction of the contracts which plaintiff sought to have
construed, and not in the trail court infringing upon the functions of the legislative branch of government.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW HAD AND THIS COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE UNITED STATES.
Respondents and Cross-Appellants do, as assumed by
Appellants, rely upon the following Acts of Congress:
'Consent is hereby given to join the United States as
a defendant in any suit ( 1) for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water ·of a river system, or other
source, or ( 2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law by purchase or exchange
or otherwise and the United States is a necessary party
to such suit. The United States, when a party to any
such suit shall ( 1) be deemed to have waived any right
to plead that the state laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amendable thereto by reason of
its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under

s
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like: circumstances; Provided, That no judgment for
costs shall be entered against the United State~ in any
such suit."
·
·
The foregoing statute should be given a liberal construction
so that its purposes will be accomplished. Bank v. King1 142
Fed. Supp. 1 at 80; Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248;
Canadian A't4iation v. United States, 324 U. S. 215 at 222;
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 350.
It is the contention of the Respondents and Cross-Appellants that this proceeding is fully authorized by the law above
quoted. The United States and its defendant officers concede,
as they must, that they are necessary parties to this suit, in that:
the United States is the owner of the project, subject, of course,
to the rights of those who have purchased a water right.
It is argued that this is not a suit for the adjudication
or administration of a water right. The pleadings and the
evidence shows that this action is brought for both purposes.
It will be seen that the Petition for a Declaratory Judgment
alleges in detail the facts ripon which plaintiffs seek the relief
prayed. It is alleged in paragraph 1 of the Petition that each
of the plaintiff corporations is and for more than sixty years
has been engaged in operating an irrigation system and delivering water to its stockholders and other water users who
have purchased water from defendant, United States (R. 5).
Similar allegations are made in paragraph 9 as to the defendant,
Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation. Company, the Clinton Irrigation Company, the Salem Canal and Irrigation Company,
and the Strawberry High Line Canal Company (R. 6).
In paragraph 11 of the Petition it is alleged that defendants
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the Springville· Irrigation -District and- the Mapleton Irrigation
District have each purchased ~ water -right from ·the United
States. The amounts of each such puq::hase and the pri~e to
be paid therefor is set out in paragraph 33 and 34' of the
Petition (R. 7). The quantity of water right purchased by
Spanish Fork City is set out in paragraph· 36 of the Petition,
and the amount of water purchased by Payson City is set out
in paragraph 37 (R. 16). In Paragraph 38 is set out the
total quantity of water right purchased from defendant, United
State, by the various parties to this proceeding.
In paragraph 23 it is alleged that in 1906 defendant,
United tSates, filed with the State Engineer an Application
to appropriate a flow of 156 cubic feet per second throughout
the year for the generation of electricity, and in paragraph 24
it is alleged that on February 4, 1909, by the Bureau of Reclamation defendant, United States, filed an Application with the
State Engineer of Utah to appropriate 300 cubic feet per second
of the unappropriated water of Spanish Fork River, and that
in 1914 it filed another Application to appropriate an additional
flow of 100 cubic feet per second of the water of Spanish
Fork River.

,

In paragraph 25 of the Petition it is alleged that the following parties to this proceeding are entitled to a flow of the
following quantities of the water of Spanish Fork River, and
that the same is superior to the water which defendant, United
States, has appropriated of the waters of Spanish Fork River:
East Bench Canal, 95 cubic feet per second;
Salem Canal & Irrigation Company, 55 cubic feet per
second;
7
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Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company, 75 cubic feet per
second;
Lake Shore Irrigation Company, 60 cubic feet per second,
and
Spanish Fork City, Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company, and Spanish Fork West Irrigation Company, 105 cubic
feet per second. .
Making a total flow of 390 cubic feet per second.
In paragraph 10 of the Petition it is alleged that in about
1926, defendant, Strawberry Water Users Association, was
organized as a corporation, and that since its o~ganization has
been engaged in the care, operation and maintenance of a
Federal Project known as the Strawberry Valley Project and
all appurtenances thereunto belonging, except the irrigation
systems of defendants Mapleton and Springville Irrigation
districts, and the Strawberry High Line Canal, a corporation,
but that such care, operation and control of such Strawberry
Valley Project is subject to the supervision of defendants,
Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation of the United States (R. 7).
In paragraph 39 of the Petition it is alleged that:·
"It is provided in the Articles of Incorporation of
the Strawberry Water Users Association that the area
irrigated by the water from the Strawberry project is
divided into 16 districts and that a director is to be
elected from each district"

and that as a result of such provision the owners of contracts
for water deliverable through the Strawberry High Line Canal
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

always have a majority of the Board of Directors of said Association, and, therefore,· control its policy (R. 17).
In paragraph 40 of.the Petition it is alleged that ever since
the Strawberry Water Users Association took over the control
of the Strawberry Project its Board of Directors have claimed
the right to determine from year to year the amount of water
that each purchaser of water from the United States is entitled
to receive pursuant to his contract of purchase, and particularly
does the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users
Association claim the right to determine the amount of charges
that shall be ·made against the users of water deliverable
through the High Line Canal from the flow of Spanish Fork
River water (R. 17).
In paragraph 48 of the Petition it is alleged that petitioners
are informed and believed that all of those .who are parties
to the proceeding have an interest in the subjectmatter of this
controversy, and that all parties who have an interest in such
subjectmatter, are made parties either by expressly being made
so, or by those parties who are expressly named parties for
themselves, and all other persons similiarly situated (R. 22).
Plaintiffs in their Petition prayed judgment that those who
had purchased water from the United States be charged with
all the wtaer that they used, except as they may show some other
or additional water right, that the Court make a provision for
those who do not use all of the water stored in the reservoir
in any given year may use the same the following year with an
allowance for evaporation not to exceed 25% thereof. That
no part of the 156 second feet of river water appropriated
for the generation of power be used for irrigation of lands
9
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under the Strawberry High Line Canal without paying to the
Strawberry Valley Project the costs that may be incurred by
reason of being deprived of the use of such water for generating
electric power; that the Court enter an appropriate decree to
insure a compliance with determination as prayed; that the
Court make such other and further order and decree as is just
and proper, and that petitioners be awarded their. costs (R.
23-24).
During the trial of this case defendants were very much
opposed to permitting any water user to receive credit in a
subsequent year for any water that he might leave in the
reservoir during any given year, and plaintiffs stated to the
Court that they would abandon such request (R. 434).
It was also made to appear during the trial that there was
no controversy concerning the matter of the obligation of those
who used water for irrigation that was appropriated for generation of power should pay for the water which was needed for
the generation of electricity (A. 503).
The Court below found as facts substantially all of the
allegations above stated. In paragraph 60 of its Findings of
Fact it found that all of the parties who had any interest in
the waters of the Project \vere parties to the proceeding. No
attack was made in the court below upon the propriety of
such finding. Nor was any suggestion made as to anyone who
was not a party to the proceeding, either in person or by right
of representation. That being so, Appellant United States and
its Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau
of Reclamation may not be heard to raise that question for
the first time on appeal.
10
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I
We have in some detail directed attention. to the pleadings
filed and _the- Findings made in the court below- because the
same show thatsuch Court· had jurisdiction of both the subjectmatter and the parties to this proceeding.
The parties are agreed. that the United States_ acquired
its right to the use of the water here involved by filing with
the State Engineer an Application to appropriate the same.
Pursuant to the filing of such Application and putting the
water applied for to a beneficial use, the United States acquired
its right to the use of the water which was stored .in the
reservoir and of the water of Spanish Fork River. The nature and
extent of the right of the purchaser of a water right from .the
United States is of necessity fixed by. the contract of purchase.
The only way of securing a determination of the rights of such
purchasers is to obtain a construction of the contracts of purchase. That is what is sought by this proceeding.
It is quite true that the Federal Declaratory Act does not
of itself authorize suit against the United States. The same
may be said of any act, except an Act of Congress. However,
when Congress has authorized suit against the United States
Government, the Declaratory Judgment Act may properly be
used as the remedy to accomplish the purpose of securing an
adjudication of water rights as well as for the administration
of such rights. That is the effect of the holding of the cases
from other jurisdictions cited by Counsel for the United States
and its Secretary of the Interior and Commisisoner of the
Bureau of Reclamation, among which are Brownell v. Ketchan
Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 Fed. (2d) 121; Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Quarles, 92 Fed. (2d) 32. That is the express holding of

11
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this Court in the case of Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.
(2d) 251, and its sequel reported in 107 Utah 272, 153 Pac.
( 2d) 544. It should be· kept in mind that under the· Act of
Congress, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 666, it is the law of the state where
the river system or other source is situated that is controlling,
and not the law of some other state.
There is cited in the Brief of the United States and its
Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation a number of cases from other jurisdictions to the
effect that only parties to the suit are bound thereby, and that
all parties to an adjudication of wtaer rights in which the
United States is a party must be joined in this action. It is not
clear just what bearing such cases have on this case. We certain! y are not here contending that anyone not a party of this
action is bound thereby. The Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah,
U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11, provides that:
''When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall
be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declartion and no declaration
shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding.''
As we have heretofore pointed out, it is alleged in the
Petition and found by the Trial Court that all of the parties
interested in the subjectmatter of this litigation are parties
thereof.
It seems to be the contention of Counsel for the United
States and its Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of
Bureau of Reclamation that an action for adjudication of
water rights in which the United States may be made a party
12
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must be brought under what is. generally referred- to as a
general adjudication as provided in U.C.A. 1953, Title· 73,
Chapter 4. It may be that. a proceeding for the determination
of water rights may be maintained against the United ··States
in conformity with the provisions of the Act just mentioned,
but there is nothing in that Act which indicates that the only
way of securing a general adjudication of water rights is pur. ···suant to the provisions of such Act.
The case of Gray v. Defa, supra, is to the contrary, as are
also some of the other cases cited in the Brief of the United
States and itsOfficers. Indeed, it is not certain that the general
adjudication statute above mentioned may be successfully followed where, as here, it is sought to secure a judgment providing for the administration of water rights. See Smith v.
District Court, etc~, et al., 69 Utah 493, 502, 256 Pac. 539, 542.
Counsel for the United States and its Secretary of the
Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation seem
to get some comfort out of such cases as Lynn v. United States,
10 Fed. (2d) 586, 588; New Mexico v. Backer, 199 Fed. (2d)
426, 428; 0 gden River Water Users Assn. v. Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District, 238 Fed. ( 2d) 936, and other
cases and authorities cited on pages 24 to 27 of their Brief.
Those cases in effect hold that the courts may not lawfully take
over the control of dams, reservoirs and facilities of a Federal
Project. There is nothing in the pleadings, the evidence, the
Findings, or the Decree in this case which is calculated to accomplish any such results.
Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 25 of the Petition that
pursuant to contract had with the United States the following
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corporations had a prior right to a flow of the waters of
Spanish Fork · River:
Spanish Fork East Bench Canal Company____________ 95 c.f.s.
Salem Canal & Irrigation Company -----~-------------- 55 c.f.s.
Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company ____________ 75 c.f.s.
Lake Shore Irrigation .Company -------------------------- 60 c'.f.s.
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Company____ 105 c.f.s.
TotaL------------------------------------------------------390 c.f.s.
and that the water had been distributed in conformity with the
foregoing agreement ever since the Federal Government has
claimed a right to some of the waters of Spanish Fork River
(R. 423).
In the Answer of the United States and its Officers, they
at first admitted the allegations paragraph 25 of the Petition (R. 109). See paragraph 15 of their Answer (R. 109).
The other defendants in paragraph 16 of their Answer also
admit the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Petition (R. 99).
It was not until late in the trial that defendants raised any
question about the comp~nies above mentioned being entitled
to a prior right to a flow of 390 c.f.s. per second (Trs. 426,
et seq.) Over objection of Counsel for plaintiffs, the Court
permitted the answer of the United States and its Officers
to be amended so as to deny that the various companies had
the priorities to the flow of the waters in Spanish Fork River
above mentioned (Tr. 441). The other defendants asked
leave to make the same amendment to their Answer (Tr. 442).
After the Court permitted the amendments above mentioned
Counsel for numerous of the defendants asked leave to with14
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draw as Counsel for some· of the defendants, ;and stated· that
they were not making a denial on behalf of the defendants
for whom they withdrew as Counsel. ·The basis for the withdrawal was that there would probably be a conflct of interest.
Counsel for the following corporations and their officers
were, by leave of Court, permitted to withdraw as their Counsel:
Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company; Clinton Irrigation
Company; Spanish Fork City, Salem Canal & Irrigation Company, and others (Trs. 445 to 45 7).
In its Order permitting Counsel to withdraw the Court
further stated that if the issues a~ to the relative rights of the
United States and the old rights in Spanish Fork River were
determined adversely to the claims of plaintiffs, the other
~efendants who have heretofore been represented by Counsel,
who have now withdrawn as their Counsel, will be given an
opportunity to offer evidence in support of their claim (Trs.
456-7). Thereupon Counsel for plaintiffs were granted leave
to reopen the case. Evidence was offered which showed that
ever since the United States made its filings on the water
of Spanish Fork River, all of the parties who claimed rights
in the water of such River had recognized and distributed
the waters of Spanish Fork River upon the basis that the above
mentioned corporations have a prior right to a flow of 390
c.f.s., and that such companies have beneficially used the same
whenever it has been available (Trs. 458-476 and Trs. 525546).
As we have heretofore called the attention of the Court
to the fact that· the pleadings, the evidence and the Findings
of fact made by the court below are all to the effect that all
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of the parties interested ·in the water ·of Spanish Fork River
were before the Court, while Counsel for. defendant United
States seem to contend to the contrary, they fail to point out
any facts in support of such contention. They also assert this
is not a class action, but fail to point out any defect in the
pleadings in support thereof. Of course, near the close of the
action when Counsel for defendants asked to amend their pleadings and Counsel for some of the defendants withdrew as
their attorney, some of the defendants were without Counsel.
However, the Court ordered that if the case should go against
them, they would be given an opportunity to be heard. So
far as appears, they are satisfied with the judgment. The
pleadings, the evidence and the Findings of the Court show
that this is a typical class action.

It is the uniform practice in this state to bring the action
against a corporation as the means of binding all of its stockholders. That is made apparent in this action. In the Petition
filed herein all of the corporations who, as such, have an
interest in the waters of Spanish Fork River have been made
parties to this action, as have also a number of stockholders
of the corporations who are also owners of contracts for the
purchase of a water right from the United States. There will
be found in the record numerous interrogatories submitted
by defendants in conformity with Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, from which it is made to appear from the
answers given that the personal plaintiffs are owners of. contracts to purchase water rights from the United States. It is
also made to appear from the pleadings and the Findings of
the Court that the stockholders of the Strawberry High Line
Canal are the owners of 40,377.26 acre feet of water deliver16
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able annually through that canal. Paragraph 38 of the Petition (R. 16).
In paragraph 27 of the Answer of the United States and
its Officers the allegation of paragraph 38 are admitted, but
allege that there is additional water not included in paragraph
38. The evidence shows that the High Line Canal Company
does not have any water other than the sum of the water
purchased by the various persons who have their water delivered
through that canal (R. 347).
During the course of the trial Counsel for the Government
and other defendants took considerable pains to point out
that not all of the contracts were the same, in that: some of
the contracts did not expressly provide for a maximum of 2
acre feet per year. All of the personal contracts, except one,
that were for river water deliverable through the Strawberry
High Line Canal make the total of the water deliverable
through such Canal 40,377.26 acre feet per annum. Paragraph
38 of the Petition, (R. 16), paragraph 27 of the Answer of
the United States and its officers, (R. 110), paragraph 26 of the
other defendants, Testimony of Mr. Hub~r, Secretary of Strawberry Water Users Association, (Tr. 162); Findings of Fact
No. 47 (R. 432) are to the same effect. If , as it appears
from the Brief filed in behalf of the United States, it is contended that each and all of the holders of a contract for the
purchase of a water right from the United States should be
made a party to this suit in order to give the court jurisdiction
of this cause, then, if that be claimed, such claim is not supported by the law. The purchases of water deliverable through
the Strawberry High Line Canal are apparently stockholders

17
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of that corporation;· or if not, a number of .the parties who
received water through that Canal were made· parties to this
action for themselves and others who received water through
that Canal. No useful purpose could be accomplished by a
decree showing the quantity of water that each was entitled
to receive. So far as appears there was no controversy with
respect thereto. When, as here, the pleadings, the evidence, the
Findings and the Decree fixed the total amount of water that
the owners of water contracts under the High Line were
entitled to receive, the requirements of a suit to establish
the rights of the parties to this action were fully complied
with. Rule 23 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Haugh v.
Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 98 Pac. 1983.

POINT III
THE COURT BELOW AND THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION.
On pages 27 of the Brief filed on behalf of the United
States and its officers, it is argued that the Court is without
jurisdiction over the Seqetary of Interior because of the broad
powers granted him by Congress and because he resides in
Washington D.C., and must be sued at the place of his residence. If that be the law, the provisions of 43 U.S.C.A., Sec.
666, is a nullity. This is an action in rem or quasi in rem and
as such must be brought where the subjectmatter of the action
is situated. It would indeed be a novel and, so far as we are
able to ascertain, an unheard of procedure to bring an action
18
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in .)Vashi11gton, D.C., tq have determined the rights to. the
use o_f water in IJtah and "for ;the ~d.tninistratigq of s_U(:h
righ~s!" U.Cr.A. 1953, .73-?-.l provides, among other, rp.atters:
·"He (State Engineer) shall have general administta.tive. supervision of the waters of the state, and of the
measurement, appropriation, apportionment and distribution thereof. He shall have power to make and
publish such rules and regulations as may be necessary
· from time to time to carry out the duties of his office,
. and particularly to secure the equitable and fair appor~
tionment and distribution of the· waters according to
the respective rights of appropriation."
No claim is made, and th-ere is nothing in the Decree entered
in this case, which gives to the State Engineer ~ny · authority
to regulate the water which is stored in the reservoir. The
controversy is with respect to the water of Spanish Fork River,
some of which was many years ago appropriated by the stockholders of. the corporate parties to this action, and some of
which was recently appropriated by the United States Government. When Congress provided for the administration of
the rights of the water in which the United States has an interest
according to state law, such provision of necessity must be
by the State Engineer. But assuming, contrary to our contentions, that the Strawberry Water Users Association acting for
the Secretary of the Interior has the right to regulate the
apportionment and distribute the water of Spanish Fork River,
still it may not perform such functions as suits its whims.
It will be observed that the contracts of those who purchased
a water right under what is characterized as the Spanish Fork
Unit contains a provision fixing the quantity of water that
is applied for "and in no case exceeding the share propor19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tionate to the irrigable acreage of the water supply actually
available or determined by the Project manager or other proper
officer of the United States, or its successor, in control of tne
project during the irrigation season for the irrigation of lands
under said unit" (Exhibit 47). Substantially the same provision
'is contained in the contracts designated as the High ·Line Unit.
In such contracts it is provided that the amount of water
delivered in any given year shall not exceed 2 acre-feet per
year (Exhibit 8).

If, as appears from the argument of Counsel for the.defendants, the Court may not alter the contracts for the purchase
of a water right from the United States, for stronger reasons
the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association may not alter such contracts. At least, the tr~al court
had no interest in this controversy, while the majority of the
Board of Directors of defendant, Strawberry Water Users
Association, are directly interested in securing more water
than is called for in the contracts, which provide for delivery
of water through the High Line Canal. They have not hesitated to demand, and pursuant to such demarid, have received
additional water with no charge, or at most only a nominal
charge for the same. We agree that the trial court was without
authority to amend the contracts, and for stronger reasons
the Board of Directors of defendant, Strawberry Water Users
Associatoin, is without such authority. We shall have more
to say about this phase of the case when we come to discuss
the Brief of the other defendants.

20
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POINT IV
THE ACTION SHOULD NOT ,BE DISMISSED, BUT
SHOULD BE AMENDED TO COMPLY WITH THE EVIDENCE.
On page 28 of the Brief of the United States and its
Officers, it is argued that the action should be dismissed,
especially because of the paragraphs 13 through 16 of the
Decree. In light of the fact that most of the provisions of
paragraphs 13, through 16 were repeatedly and vigorously
urged upon the Court below by the defendants who succeeded
in having the Court adopt the same over the objections of
plaintiffs, it ill behooves them to now urge that the Court
should not have ruled with them on such matters.
It is, of course, elementary law that one may not be heard

to complain before an appellate court upon matters which
the party complaining succeeded in inducing the lower court
to rule with such complaining party. 5 C.J.S., Sec. 1501, pagu
857, and cases cited in footnotes.

POINT V
THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM COMPLAINING BECAUSE THE COURT MADE PROVISION
FOR RETAINING JURISDICTION TO THE PURPOSE OF.
MAKING FUTURE CHANGES IN THE DECREE.
We are agreed with Appellants that the trial court erred
in retaining jurisdiction of this cause for a period of ten years,
and we commend them for coming to this conclusion, which
21
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is ·in accord with· the contention of the Respondents in the
court below.
We shall reserve further discussion of this· phase of the
case until we consider our Cross-Appeal.
POINT VI.
Beginning on page 46 and continuing to the end of the
Brief of the United States and its Officers, it is contended that
the Court should not have interferred with the practice that
has prevailed since the United States turned the control of
the project over to the Strawberry Water Users Association.
The evidence shows without conflict that during thirteen of
the years since the control of the project has been turned over
to the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association plaintiffs, who have purchased a water right from the
United States, have been deprived of the use of a part of the
water which they purchased. On page 7 of the trial Court's
Memorandum of Opinion will be found an analysis of the
amount of_ water available for use during various years, and
the charges for river water that was made against the water
users under the High Line Canal. During the time the Government had control of the project the parties who received
the water purchased through the established irrigation systems
were supplied with the full amount purchased. Since the Board
of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association have
been in control as little as 35% has been received by such
purchasers. The water users who have purchased water deliverable through the High Line Canal have been charged
less and less for the river water used by them. During the
22
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period of 1939 to 1955~ both years inclusive,: the :average,' rate
of charge ·'for such water used by those who receive water
throllgh the High Lin(;! Canal w~s only 15.5. See E;xhibits 69
and 73. It' requires no argument to show that· if the ~sers of
such water are charged for all of the water they use, there
will be more water· in the. reservoir for the use of those who
received their water through the established irrigation systems.
It is argued that the project as a whole will be benefitted by
the method followed by the Board of Directors of the Stntwberry Water Users Association even if it results in depriving
the users of water under the old established irrigation systems
of some of the water they have purchased. That is the same
argument that is made by those who would take property
from those who have and give it to those who have not. The
law has not yet approved such doctrines, and until .it does
the courts are not empowered to so decree. Nor is the doctrine
that one may be a judge in a case where he has a direct financial
interest that will be enhanced, met with approval. In this case
the evidence shows without conflict that a rna jority of the Board
of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association will
be and are being benefitted by making a small charge for
river water delivered to them through the High Line Canal.
So far as we are able to ascertain no appellate court should
or has put its stamp of approval upon such a procedure.
POINT VII
CORRECTION OF PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
DEFENDANTS, STRAWBERRY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL
FACTS OF CONTROLLING IMPORTANCE.
23
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The plaintiffs, who are Respondents and Cross-.Appellants,
have been served with three sets of Briefs, which makes it
necessary for them to, in effect, file three Briefs in answer to
the various arguments made by the three sets of Appellants.
We shall, however, attempt to avoid needless repetition. These
arguments made so far are applicable. and intended to apply
to each of the three sets of Briefs.
In the main the statements of· the facts contained in the
various Briefs are correct so far as they go, but in at least one
important particular the statements are in error.
On page 4 of the brief of Strawberry Water Users Association it is said:
.. During the course of the trial the trial court indicated that it was going to adjudicate in this proceeding
the relative collective rights between plaintiffs and defendants to the use of the waters of Spanish Fork
River (Tr. 425-457, incl.) Up until this point defendants had proceeded on the basis that this action was
limited to an interpretation of the water Contracts
(Tr. 442-445, 446). When the Court took the view
that it was going to ~d judicate the relative collective
rights to the use· of the waters of the Spanish Fork
River, (Tr. 447}, a conflict of interest between some
of the defendants represented by the firm of Christenson, Novak and Paulson arose, and it became necessary
to withdraw as Counsel for some of the defendants.
(Tr. 450.)"
As to that phase of the case, this is what transpired. In paragraph 25 of the Petition (R. 10), it is alleged that the various
canals of the Corporations who have a right to the use of
waters of Spanish Fork River:
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were filled to capacity with water from Spanish
Fork River and measurements taken of such flow, and
thereupon contracts were entered into with each of
such companies and Spanish Fork City wherein and
whereby it was agreed that plaintiff, East Bench Canal
Company, should be entitled to a flow of 95 cubic feet
per second, defendant Salem Canal & Irrigation Company to a flow of 55 cubic feet per second, Spanish Fork
South Irrigation Company to a flow of 75 cubic feet
per second, Lake Shore Irrigation Company to a flow
of 60 cubic feet per second, and defendants, Spanish
Fork City and Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company, and plaintiff Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation
Company to a flow through the Mill Race of 105 cubic
feet per second. That such rights consisting of a total
flow of 390 cubic feet per second were by such Contracts admitted to be superior to any rights acquired
by the defendant United States on account of the certificates issued to it pursuant to the filing made by it
as hereinbefore alleged."
By paragraph 15 of the Answer of defendant United
States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation, it is alleged: "Admits paragraph
25 except for the last sentence thereof which is denied" (R.
169.
In paragraph 16 of the Answer of defendants Strawberry
Water Users, et al., the allegations of paragraph 25 are admitted except if any Company is unable to beneficially use
the amount of water mentioned in paragraph 25, such Company may not transfer the same to another Company (R. 99).
No attempt was made to amend the pleadings above mentioned
until quite some time after plaintiff had rested, which occurred
on January 8, 1957. See Transcript 197. In the Answer of the
25
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State Engineer paragraph 25 of the Petition is admitted. It
was not until nuine~ous witnesses were called by the: defendants
and various Exhibits had been offered and received .that the
defendants sought, and the Trial Court granted them, leave
to amend. See Tninsctipt 425. Upon leave .being granted the
defendant~ d~nied paragraph 25 of plaintiff's Petition. It
was then that .Counsel for defendants, other than the United
States and its officers, withdrew as Counsel for some of the
defendants (Tr. 447-457).
It will be seen that 228 pages of testimony of defendants'
wi,tnesses were taken after plaintiff rested before the defendants
sought leave to amend and leave was granted over objection
q£. plaintiff. After the amendment was made plaintiff asked·
and was granted leave to amend paragraph 25 of the Petition
by striking out the words "certificates issued" and substituting
therefore "filings made" (Tr. 435). The plaintiffs were also
granted leave to reopen the case. The attention of the Court
was called to the following language contained in the various
contracts of those who had established water rights in Spanish
Fork River:
"the Company (Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company) may divert from the flow of Spanish Fork River
such an amount of water as it is entitled to under:
A. a decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah dated April 20, 1899, rendered by Judge W.
M. McCarthy; and
B. decree of the same court dated January 1, 1901,
rendered by John E. Booth, and subsequent appropriations through prescriptive rights.
The total amount of said water diverted at one time
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not to exceed 75 .second feet, and the company so far
as its rights and interest are concerned will permit the
United States to take all other waters of Spanish Fork
River without interference." (Tr. 438)
Similar provisions were contained in other contracts except
that the amount of water is that heretofore specified, namely:
105 second feet in the Mill race,, 95 second feet in the canal
of the East Bench; 55 second feet in the Salem Canal and 60
second feet in the Lake Shore Canal. The Court having permitted plaintiffs to reopen they called Wayne Francis, the
Water Commissioner, who testified that he had been Water
Commissioner on Spanish Fork River since 1941 (Tr. 408);
that at all times since he had been such Commissioner no one
purporting to represent the United States had questioned the
right of the old water users of Spanish Fork River to a prior
right of 390 second feet (Tr. 459, 461). That was also the
testimony of Robert E. Huber, the Secretary of defendant
Water Users Association (Tr. 463-467), and of Arthur W.
Finley, a director of defendant Water Users Association (Tr.
468-472). There is no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Leo M.
Banks was called as a witness by plaintiff and testified that he
is an officer of plaintiff West Field Irrigation Company (Tr.
526); that the various companies who are the owners of
water rights in Spanish Fork River have beneficially used the
390 cubic feet per second whenever the same is available (Tr.
530). The testimony of Lawrence E. Johnson (Tr. 532), is
to the same effect, so also is the testimony of Joseph Hanson
(Tr. 538).
In the statement of the case on behalf of defendant Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., mention is made of the
27
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fact that there are sixteen members of the Board of Directors
of defendant Strawberry Water Users, but attention is not
called to the fact that a majority of such directors are subscribers for water deliverable through the defendant Strawberry High Line Canal Company. It is, however, so alleged
ih paragraph 39 of the Petition (R. 17). In paragraph 27
of the Answer of defendants Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., it is admitted that a majority of the board of
directors of said defendant Association are subscribers for
water deliverable through the Starwberry High ·Line Canal
(R. 101). While in the Answer of the United States, et aL,
they deny the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Petition
for lack of information, the trial court found the allegations
of paragraph 39 to be true in its finding No. 41 (R. 429).
No attack is made upon that Finding. .
Moreover, at the commencement of the trial, Counsel for
defendants Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., expressly admitted the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Petition,
and Council for the United States stated that he won't make
an issue of the allegations of paragraph 39 (Tr. 14).
The decree entered in this cause, paragraph 13, (R. 446),
provides:
"That in light of the fact that the quantity of water
in Spanish Fork River to which the United States and
its successors in interest have the right to the use
thereof varies during different years and during different seasons of the same year, the Court has deemed it
proper and necessary to make and does make the fol-'
lowing provisions of the manner in which the waters
of the project shall be regulated and distributed during
2R
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the next ten years after the entry of this decision as
follows:
That all water users shall be charged in full for all
stored water and for all project river water used during
periods when reservoir water is being released.
;~

;.

'l

That ,in any calendar year when the project supply
will probably not be sufficient to furnish the holders
of approved applications 100 per cent of the amount
of water applied for and approved under their applications, then all users of project water shall be charged
in full for such water used after May 1st and 30 per
cent for water used prior to May 1st.
That in any calendar year when the project supply
will probably be sufficient to furnish 100 per cent or
more of project water covered by their approved applications, then users of project river water shall be
charged as follows:
....

(a) For water received prior to May 1st when water
is not being released from the reservoir 20 per cent;
(b) For water received between May 1st and May
31st when water is not being released from the reservoir 50 per cent;
(c) For water received after May 31st 100 per cent.
The term "project river water" as herein used refers
to water from Spanish Fork River available under the
appropriations made by the United States on the flow
of Spanish Fork River."
By paragraph 14 of the Decree it is provided that the
State Engineer of Utah is directed to make an announcement
on or before April 1st of each year an estimate as to whether
or not the supply of water from the project will be sufficient
for the ensuing irrigation season to furnish all holders of

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

approved applications -100 per cent of water applied for and
approved under the approved applications, such estimate shall
be made by said State .Engineer from such information as
he shall deem to be reliable and adequate. The estimate made
by the State Engineer shall not affect the right of the Directors
of the Strawberry Water Users Association to make their own
independent determination as to the available water supply
for the purpose of administering the project, but shall be
binding upon the Board as to the percentage charges to be
made for the use of project river water as hereinbefore directed
unless and until the same is upon good cause shown to be
improper and ordered changed by the Court.

POINT VIII
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
INTERPRETED THE WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS
AND ERRED IN FAILING TO SO CONSTRUE THE SAME
SO THAT EACH APPLICANT FOR THE PURCHASE OF
WATER SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH THE FULL
AMOUNT OF WATER USED.
In discussing Point I of the points raised by defendants
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., it is pointed out
that the trial court in substance concluded:

" ( 1) That the high water of Spanish Fork River constituted part of the Stra\vberry Project. Conclusion 12).
( 2) That in the management and operation of the
project the Strawberry Water Users Association
does not have the right to distribute the high
30
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I

j
j

waters of Spanish Fork River without charging
the users thereof. (Conclusion 14) .

( 3) That the charge to be made should be adequate
to properly protect the rights of the other users
under the project. (Conclusion 15).

If the trial court had stopped there, defendants
would have no real quarrel with those conclusions with
some reservations."
The Court was clearly right in its above mentioned Conclusion No. 1. See Exhibit 1.
Finding No. 34 of the Trial Court shows that on February
4, 1909, defendant United States by its Bureau of Reclamation
filed an application with the State Engineer of Utah to appropriate 390 cubic feet of the unappropriated water of Spanish
Fork River to be used to irrigate 19,907.83 acres of land. The
lands particularly described in the application are located in
the southerly end of Utah County, Utah. That a Certification
of Appropriation has been issued for the water applied for.
These lands are irrigated through the Strawberry High Line
Canal.
As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 2 (Conclusion
14), (R. 446), plaintiffs are in accord with the same and
claim that the charge should be for the full amount of water
used.
As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 3 (Conclusion 15), (R. 447), plaintiffs claim that a full charge for
water used is necessary to protect the rights of the other water
users under the project, and that each water user has only
such rights as are granted to him by his Contract.
31
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As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 4 (Conclusion 16), (R. 447}, plaintiffs claim that this action was brought
and prosecuted for the purpose of construing Contracts, and
it is immaterial whether or not water is lost to the project.
If it is lost to the project, it may be beneficially used by other
applicants. Indeed, this Court judicially knows that other
claims are being made to the waters lost to the project. Salt
Lake City, et al. v. Anderson, et al., 106 Utah 350, 148 Pac.
(2d) 346.
On page 26 of the Brief of Strawberry Water Users Association mention is made of there being approximately a total
of 717 contracts under the Strawberry High Line Canal, and
that such Contracts are of nine different forms. The fact that
there are nine different forms of contracts for the purchase
of water deliverable through the High Line Canal cannot be
said to. be material in this case. Neither under the pleadings
nor the evidence in this case is there any controversy between
the various owners of water right contracts represented by
shares of stock in defendant High Line Canal Company.
In paragraph 38, (R. 16), of the Petition for a Declaratory
Judgment it is alleged that the number of acre feet of water
p~rchased from the United States, which are annually deliverable through the Strawberry High Line Canal, are 40,377.25
acre feet. It is so found in Finding No. 39 of the Court's Findings (R. 428). It was so testified to by Robert E. Huber, the
Secretary of defendant Strawberry Water Users Association,
with this qualification, that if an individual who had an application for wtaer under the High Line Unit had not paid his
assessment, the number of acre feet for which he had filed
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an application would not be included in the figure showing
the acre feet of water deliverable through the High Line
Canal (Tr. 179).
This controversy is not as to the amount of water purchased
by each owner of stock in the High Line Canal, but as to the
total amount of water that such stockholders are entitled to
receive thn;mgh that canal. A finding as to the acre feet of
water that each stockholder owned in the High Line Canal
would not aid _in resolving this controversy, but would make
needless voluminous Findings, Conclusions and Decree.
On page 28· of the Brief of Appellant Strawberry Water
Users Association the attention of the Court is called to certain
Findings, Conclusions and evidence to the effect that the flow
of water in Spanish Fork River is less valuable than storage
water. It is true that those who bought storage water were
required to pay therefor at the rate of $45.00 per acre foot,
while those who purchased part storage water and part river
water were required to pay only $80.00 per acre of irrigable
land which entitled them to two acre feet per annum, and
in addition to that, those whose lands were irrigated through
the High Line Canal had such canal constructed with money
chargeable against the entire project, including those who were
required to pay $45.00 per acre foot. Those who were required
to pay $45.00 per acre foot were required to furnish their
own means of conveying water from Spanish Fork River to
their lands. See Finding No. 31 (R. 425). River water is
generally available in the early season in larger quantities.
That later the value of water for irrigation entirely depends
on the need of the crops growing on the land to be irrigated.
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The situation is well explained by Elmer Jacob, an engineer
of many years of experience in the use of water for irrigation
(Trs. 510, 511 ~nd 521, et seq.) Be that as it may, it would
be a novel and so far as· we are able to ascertain an unwarranted
basis for a determination of the extent of a water right purchased by a written contract to engage in a speculation as
to the relative value of early and late water. Water put to a
beneficial use is the basis of the right without regard to
whether it is for early or late irrigation.
There is another somewhat novel argument made on page
29 of the Brief of Strawberry Water Users Association, namely:
that the defendant "Association must dispose of such high
water at whatever partial charge those who can use it will
accept when it is available, otherwise such water will flow
into Utah Lake," etc.
We have no quarrel with the doctrine announced in the
case of Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 142 Pac. (2d) 866, 105 Utah 468, where it is
held that if one stockholder of a company has no use for water,
some other stockholder may use the same. Indeed, if no
stockholder of a corporation or other owner has use for water,
a stranger may doubtless use the same. However, that is not
this case. The clear effect of the manner in which the Board
of Directors of defendant Strawberry Water Users Association
has been regulating the waters of the project, especially during
recent years, is to take water from those who have purchased
stored water and give it to those \vho have purchased both
stored and river water. If the water users under the High Line
Canal are charged with all of the river water used by them,
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it necesa.rily follows that they will be entitled to less of the
stored water. To illustrate. Assume a water user under the
High Line Canal is the owner of one hundred acres of land
for which he is entitled to two hundred acre feet of water
under his contract for the pur~pase of a water right from the
United States. Assume further that he uses 100 acre feet of
river water and he is only charged with 50 acre feet. He would
then be entitled to 150 acre feet of stored water, whereas, if
he were charged with the full amount of the river water used,
he would be entitled to only 100 acre feet of stored water.
Under the assumed facts the stored water would be depleted
50 acre feet, and all of the owners of a right to the stored
water would stand ·the loss. It does require a mathematical
genius to figure out such results. But it is said that if the purchasers of water available through the High Line Canal are
charged in full for the water used by them, they will use less
river water and more stored water. Assuming that to be so,
does that fact justify only a partial charge for the river water
used by those who have a water right deliverable through the
High Line Canal ? There is no language in any of the contracts
of those whose water is deliverable through the High Line
Canal that they may have the use of any river water without
being charged for all that is used. Most of the contracts for
water deliverable through the High Line Canal provide that:
"The quantitative measure of water right hereby
applied for is that quantity of water which shall be
beneficially used for the irrigation of said irrigable
land up to, but not exceeding two ( 2) acre feet per acre
per anum, measured at the head of Strawberry High
Line Canal, and in no case exceeding the share proportionate to irrigable acreage of the water supply
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actually available as determineci by the Project Manager or other proper officer of the United States, or its
successor, in the control of the project during the irrigation season for the irrigation of the lands under said
unit."
It is so alleged in the Petition, paragraph 29, (R. 12),
admitted in the Answer of defendant Strawberry Water Users
Association (R. 99), and in the Answer of the United States
(R. 109). It is also shown by Exhibit-PHs. Ex. 8, and found
by the trial court, Finding 30, (R. 425). As heretofore stated
the pleadings, the evidence and the decree also show that the
total number of acre feet required to fully supply those who
had contracts for water deliverable through the High Line
Canal is 40,377.26 acre feet per annum. Some of those contracts provided for 3 acre feet per annum, and some were silent :
as to the quantity of water covered by the Contracts, but
as above stated the pleadings, the evidence, and the Findings
all show the total number of acre feet deliverable annually
to those owning water under the High Line Canal. That being
so no useful purpose would be served by making a list of
the 71 7 purchasers of a water right under that Canal.
In the Brief of defendants Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., attention is called to the fact that in the Contracts dealing with the sale of water to the purchasers of a
water right deliverable through the old established irrigation
systems referred to as 'the Spanish Fork Unit, it is provided
that:
"The said water shall be delivered in Spanish Fork
River at the head of the . . . . . . during the months
of May to September, inclusive, at such a rate of delivery as the water right applicant may desire, insofar
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as such rate may be feasible, as determined by the
United States, but in no event at a rate of flow per
month greater than 40 per cent of the total annual
supply in a flow as nearly uniform as practicable unless
otherwise mutually agreed."
No such provision is contained in the Contracts for the purchase
of water deliverable through the High Line Canal, but such
Contracts do provide that not to exceed 2 acre feet_ shall be
delivered annually during the irrigation season. It is clear that
the reason for this difference in the language is that it was
contemplated that the purchasers of water whose land was
under the old established irrigation systems would receive
stored water which was to be conveyed through a tunnel which
was limited in carrying capacity, and that those who already
had a water right in Spanish Fork River were supplied with
early water or could arrange to exchange water with those
who had a water right in Spanish Fork River. It will further
be noted that the Contracts with those whose water was to
be delivered through the established systems were to have the
water delivered into Spanish Fork River. On the other hand,
the river water purchased from the United States could not
be said to be delivered into Spanish Fork River by the United
States because it was already there. To say that the early
water delivered into the High Line Canal for use in the irrigation of the lands under that Canal was not delivered during
the irrigtaion season fails to make sense. An irrigation season
must mean the time people irrigated. The United States made
its filing on the waters of Spanish Fork River to be used for
the irrigation of the lands described in the application from
March 1st to November 1st. See Plfs. Ex. 1, and Plfs. Ex. 2.
That is the land under the High Line Canal.
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It is said on page 29 of the Brief of the Strawberry Water
Users Association, et al., that the users of water under the
High Line Canal are in a "bargaining position. They do not
particularly want the water but will take it at a partial charge."
We digress to observe that the practice of coaxing farmers to
use more water is certainly an innovation in the use of water
in this and other western states. The aim is and has been to
secure a reduction in the use of water, not to induce farmers
to use more water. If the Contracts which plaintiffs seek to
have construed mean anything, they mean that the period of
bargaining was at the time the Contracts were signed. Those
who desired to purchase more than 2 acre feet were permitted
to do so. See Tr. 180. Some of those who did not purchase
all the water they desired were permitted to purchase additional water even after the operation of the project was taken
over by the Strawberry Water Users Association '(Tr. 1,58).
During the trial and in the Brief of defendants the claim
is stressed that by the practice of allowing those who receive
water through the High Line Canal to be charged only for
a part, if any, of the water used, will result in preserving some
of the stored water and result in a benefit to the entire project.
It will be seen that those who have water rights deliverable
through the High Line Canal are entitled to 40,377.26 acre
feet per annum, and that the total number of acre feet purchased in the project is 70,780.32 acre feet per annum. Thus
the quantity of water deliverable through the High Line Canal
is substantially 4/7 of the total amount of water purchased
in the project. Thus, if any of the river water is allowed to
run into Utah Lake, the water users under the High Line Canal
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will stand to lose at least 4/7ths of the water so permitted to
run into Utah Lake, that is to say, if instead of using river
water they use stored water, the amount of their stored water
will be reduced to the extent that they could have beneficially
used river water. It is doubtful if any such results will follow
by a practice of charging all purchasers of a water right with
the full amount of the water actually used, whether it be river
water or stored water. In any event there is no language in any
of the Contracts which may be said to give the Board of
Directors of the defendant Association authority to make only
a partial charge for water use. The provision of the Contracts
for the purchase of water is to the contrary. It is provided in
the Contracts of both the High Line Unit and the Spanish
Fork Unit that the water delivered to any purchasers of water
shall:
tn no case exceed the share proportionate to the
irrigable acreage of the water supply actually available
as determined by the Project Manager, or other proper
officer of the United States, or its successor, in the
control of the project, during the irrigation season for
the irrigation of lands under said Unit."

The practice followed by the Board of Directors of defendant
Association, which its Counsel seek to have the Court approve,
is at war with such provision.
It is further argued by Counsel for the defendant Association that its Board of Directors have a right to do as it
pleases with the water entrusted to its control. That neither
the stockholders of the Association nor the courts may interfere
with the manner in which the Board of Directors of defendant
control the waters of the project. On page 33 of defendant
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Association's, et al., Brief cases are cited which it is claimed
support such view. Such claim is without support in law for
two reasons, they being: 1st. A substantial number of purchasers of water rights under the project who are not.· stockholders in the defendant Association; 2nd. The Board of
Directors of the defendant Association must recognize and
protect the rights of each stockholder as fixed by his Contract
of Purchase. The evidence shows· without conflict that only
about 82% of the purchasers of water under the project are
members of defendant Association (Tr. 65). To prevent the
defendant Association from permitting the stockholders of
the High Line Canal to use more water than their Contracts
call for will result in depriving other purchasers of water
who are not stockholders of the defendant Association, is
not an interference with the internal affairs of the Association,
but a determination by the Court that the Association must
so control and distribute the water under its control so that
each owner of water right shall receive the amount of water
to which he is entitled, which in this case means the water
that he has purchased as provided for in his Contract of
Purchase. As to the duty of a corporation engaged in the
control of the water evidenced by certificates issued to its
stockholders the law is well settled in this and other jurisdictions, that the Company must distribute the amount of
water to each stockholder to which he is entitled. If the Company fails to do so the Court will direct that the same be done.
See Yardley v. Long Canal, 177 Pac. (2d) 530; Burtenshaw
z;. Bountiful Irrigation Co., 90 Utah 196, 61 Pac. (2d) 312;
Baird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 Pac. 1060;
Genola Town Z'. Santt~qttin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. (2d) 930.
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The evidence in this case conclusively shows that. the
manner in which the Board of Directors of defendant Association has been distributing and seek to control the -water
of the Federal Project here involved is contrary to the law
announced in the foregoing cases.
A number of exhibits were received in evidence showing
the amount of project river and stored water delivered to the
various corporations which are parties to this action during
the period that the project has been in operation. Referring
to Defendants' Exhibit 73, which contains the same information as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 69, these facts are made to appear.
During the period extending from the time water of the
project was first used up to and including 1931 there was
sufficient water to fully supply the amount of water applied
for in the various Contracts of Purchase. For a period of five
years, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933, an arrangement was
had between those who received their project water through the
old established irrigation systems and the newly constructed
High Line Canal whereby the High Line Canal should be
charged with 5000 acre feet per annum for the river water used
by its stockholders without regard to the amount of river
water so used. This arrangement was abandoned in 1934
because much less than 5000 acre feet of river water was
available. See Finding numbered 43. See also Minutes of the
Strawberry Water Users Association meeting held on February
18, 1929, marked as page 5 of the meeting of that date, which
is a part of Defendants' Exhibit 83. After the arrangement
dealing with the charge to be made the High Line Canal for
river water was abandoned other attempts were made to come
to an agreement with respect to the charges to be made for
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the use of river water. See Defendants' Exhibit· 8. But no
further arrangement was had. Since 1933 the Board of, Directors
of defendant Association has from time to tiriie fixed the
charges that have been made for river water used by the stockholders of the High Line Canal. Exhibits ·69 and 73 above
mentioned show that in 1932 the High Line Canal used 13,425
acre feet of river water for which they were charged the
agreed amount of 5000 acre feet; that in 1933 the High Line
Canal used 13,129 acre feet of river water for which the agreed
charge of 5000 acre feet was made. It will be seen that in 1932
there was sufficient water to supply only 35% of the water
provided in the Contracts for the purchase of project water,
and in 1933 only 76% of the water provided in the Contract
for the purchase of water. After the arrangement for making
a definite charge of 5000 acre feet for river water used by the
stockholders of the High Line Canal, the amount of water used,
the· amount charged and the percentage of water available
for the subscribers of water was as follows:
Year

1934
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

Amount Used By
High Line
Canal
13,996
3,996
11,176
17,326
16,132
11,462
1,123
9,235
10,708
9,539
4,107
11,235
7,671

Amount Charged
High Line
Canal
5,146
89
5,146
4,146
5,512
4,880
0
1,524
4,543
348
352
0
859

Amount of
Water
Available
70
35
70
80
85
90
100
80
80
80

85
80
90
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During the next ten years the High Line. Canal used substantially•more water than was charged against it, but sufficient
water was made available to supply the full amount of water
that was contracted for. It will be observed that during some
years the report shows that water was wasted. A statement
of the years in which the water was wasted will be found at
the bottom of Defendants' Exhibit 73.
Mr. Elmer Jacob, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, (Tr. 66), and with more than 30 years experience in
connection with the operation of irrigation projects, (Tr. 67),
testified that if all the project water that was delivered into
the various canal systems had been charged to the water users
under such canals from and after 1935, there would have been
sufficient project water to fully supply all of the water purchased (Tr. 78-79).
The Trial Court made this Finding, the accuracy of which
is not questioned:
"52. That in thirteen years between 1932 and 1952 the
supply of water under the project was insufficient
to supply water users with the full amount of water
applied for by them. That the average percentage
received by all water users under the project in said
thirteen years was 78.15 per cent of the amount
applied for.
"53. That during said thirteen years the amount of
water diverted from Spanish Fork River for use as
project water averaged 10,609 acre feet annually
and the average charge made therefor was 26.76
per cent of the amount received.
"54. That during the period from 1919 to 1938, both
inclusive, it apears that an average of 9310 acre
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feet of water was diverted annually from Spanish
Fork River for use as project water, and that the
rate of charge therefor during said period was
46.4 per cent of the volume used. That during the
period from 1939 to 1955, both inclusive, the
average diversion of water from the river for use
as project wtaer was 6,940 acre feet, and the
average rate of charge therefor was 15.5 per cent
of the volume used. (See Defendants' Exhibits
69 and 73).
It will be seen from the Exhibits, and also from the Findings of the Court, that as water in the project be<:ame less the
percentage of charge made for river water delivered to the users
of water under the High Line Canal became less.

The right to the use of water is a vested right which is
recognized and confirmed by Article XVII, Section 1, of the
Constitution of Utah, and the authorities generally. Skinner
v. Jordan Valley Irr. Dist., 300 Pac. 336,27 Idaho 643. It is
also the established law that a member of a Board of Directors ,)
may not vote in matters where he has a personal interest. 19
C.J.S., page 94, Sec. 749c, and cases cited in foot notes. Article
XI of the Articles of Incorporation of the defendant Straw"
berry Water Users Association provides that a majority of the

members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quorum
and as such authorized to exercise the corporate powers of the
Corporation. See plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. If the nine members
who are owners of and represent water rights under the High
Line Canal may determine the charges that shall be made
for river water deliverable through the High Line Canal, they
are not only ignoring the express provisions of the Contracts
for the purchase of water rights, but are depriving those who
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own water deliverable through the old irrigation systems of
a part of the water right purchased by them.

POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN FIXING THE PERCENTAGE THAT SHOULD BE CHARGED FOR RIVER
WATER AND THAT SUCH ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS.
What we have said as to Point I of the Brief of the
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., is applicable to
Point II thereof. We shall not repeat what we have heretofore
said in answer to Point I. It is said that the best interest of
the project as a whole will be furthered by permitting the
Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association
to dispose of the water of the project as they see fit. There are
those who believe that it would be to the best interest of the
people of a county as a whole to let some one determine and
:fix the amount of property or income that each person should
receive. We have not yet adopted such a doctrine. We are
still governed by the law that the water rights of the indi- vidual are entitled to protection. So also are contracts, which
provide for the amount of water that a purchaser shall receive,
valid and enforceable. The majority of the Board of Directors
of Strawberry Water Users Association are powerless to impair
such contracts. That may not be done even by the Legislative
Branch of Government. Sec. 10, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States, Sec. 18, Article I of the Constitution of
Utah.
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It may be argued that if those who receive their water
through the old irrigation systems are given the amount of
water that they have purchased, they have no just cause to
complain. During a period of 13 years they did not receive
the water purchased. According to the testimony of Mr. Jacob
this shortage was brought about because more water was given
to the users of water under the High Line Canal than was
called for by the Contracts for water deliverable through that
Canal. That much of said shortage was caused by such practice
is not open to doubt, especially during dry seasons. If there are
some water users who have failed to purchase sufficient water,
and if, as defendants claim, there is still water available for
sale, it would seem that the only way that such water can
legally be disposed of is by the sale thereof. By that means the
cost of paying for the project will be borne by those who receive
the water and in proportion to the benefits derived from the
project. For those who have purchased 3 acre feet of water
to pay the full purchase price thereof and to supply others
with water for only a part of what they use, is not only wrong
but is in direct conflict with the Contracts which Respondents
seek to have construed.

POINT X
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE CONTRACTS PROVIDE THAT CHARGE SHALL BE
MADE FOR WATER DELIVERED PRIOR TO MAY 1st.
Under Point III, pages 41 to 46 of the Brief of defendants
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., it is argued that
because the Contract with the High Line Canal provides that
46
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water will be delivered during the ~irrigation season of May
1st to October 1st of each year in accordance with the terms of
existing Contracts, such language does not say that no charge
at all should be made for water prior to May 1st. Counsel
fails to inform the Court as to what is to be done with the
language of .the contracts, with the individual purchasers which
provides that not to exceed 2 acre feet per annum shall be used
by the purchaser. Nor is any attempt made to explain away
the undisputed fact that there are 40,377.26 acre feet deliverable through the High Line Canal per annum. Nor does he
explain away the fact that everyone connected with the project
have, ever since the project was in operation, understood that
at least some charge should be made for water delivered to the
water users under the High Line Canal prior to May 1st.
· The language above mentioned does not say that the
irrigation season is limited to the period of May 1st to October
1st of each year. It merely says that "during the irrigation
season of May 1 to October 1· of each year." The only water
that may be said to be delivered is the stored water. The river
water is not under the control of anyone except the River
Commissioner. There is no occasion to limit the quantity of
water that may be called for to 18% in May and not to exceed
27Yz% in any one month as to the river water. It is obvious
that these provisions of the Contract apply only to the stored
water. The tunnel that carries the water through the mountain
from the reservoir to the headwaters of Spanish Fork River
has a limited carrying capacity, hence the necessity ot" requiring
a uniform flow and limiting the amount that is called for in
any one month. It was apparently believed, and in the main
correctly believed, that the flow of Spanish Fork River would
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supply the needs of all of the purchasers of water prior to
May 1st. To say that the irrigation season did not begin until
May 1st would fly in the face of the very foundation of the
right of the United States and its purchasers of a water right,
namely: the application to file upon the water of Spanish
Fork River for the irrigation of lands under the High Line
Canal from March 1st to November 1st. (See Plfs. Ex. 1, and
Certificate of Appropriation, Plfs. Ex. 2).

POINT XI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIXING THE
EXTENT OF THE OLD ESTABLISHED RIGHTS IN SPANISH FORK RIVER.
The Declaratory Judgments Act, U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11,
provides that "all persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration."
The established water rights on Spanish Fork River were of
necessity affected by the declaration of rights to the waters of
Spanish Fork River. Without a determination of the established rights of the old Companies as to the nature and extent
of such right, it could not be determined the nature and extent,
if any, of the rights acquired by the United States under its
filings. Moreover, the old irrigation systems were obligated
to deliver water purchased from the United States to various
purchasers whose land was under the established irrigation
systems.
As will be seen from what has heretofore been said, it
was only near the close of the trial that the defendants sought
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to claim that the various old established rights did not amount
to 390 second feet. There is no evidence that such rights are
limited to 243 second feet, or any amount less than 390 cubic
feet. Mention is made of adverse use. The claims of the old
Companies to the water of Spanish Fork River are not based
upon adverse use. The claims are made as prior appropriation
and the admission of the United States that such claims are
prior to the applications made by the United States.
ANSWER TO BRIEF OF THE STATE ENGINEER
The Brief of the State Engineer states One Point and Five
subdivisions thereof upon which he relies for a reversal of the
Judgment. Much of what has been said in answer to the points
relied upon by the United States, et al., and the Strawberry
Water Users Association, et al., is applicable to the points
relied upon by the State Engineer.

POINT XII
IT IS TRUE THAT THERE WAS NO ISSUE AS TO
THE RIGHTS OF THE ESTABLISHED IRRIGATION
COMPANIES.
In paragraph 25 of the Petition it is alleged that the
various canals of the established irrigation companies were
filled with water from Spanish Fork River, and it was agreed
that plaintiff East Bench should have 95, Salem Canal & Irrigation Company 55 cubic feet, Spanish Fork South Irrigation
Company 75 cubic feet, Lake Shore Irrigation Company 60
cubic feet, Spanish Fork City, Spanish Fork Southeast Irriga49
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tion Company and Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Company 105 cubic feet per second, a total of 390 cubic feet per
second (R. 11) .
In paragraph 1 of the Answer of the State Engineer paragraphs 1 to 29 are admitted..
.
There was thus no issue as to the amount of prior water
right owned by various established water rights on Spanish
Fork River because it was alleged by the plaintiffs and admitted
by the State Engineer.

POINT XIII

ALL OF THE PARTIES NECESSARY TO AN ADJUDICATION OF THIS CONTROVERSY WERE BEFORE THE
COURT.
This action was brought to secure a construction of the
Contracts for the purchase of water from the United States.
The only persons who were interested in that controversy were
those who had Contracts with the United States touching the
water filed upon by the United States. It would have been idle
to have brought in all of the parties involved in the case of
Salt Lake City v. Anderson, et al. That case has been pending
in the District Court of Salt Lake County for more than 20
years, and apparently no nearer settlement than it was 20
years ago. Under such circumstances the doctrine announced
in such cases as Matchellz·. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation
Co., 1 Utah (2d) 313, 265 Pac. (2d) 1016, is especially applicable here. The people interested in this controversy should
have the same settled during their lifetime and thus avoid the
50
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loss that will be sustained ·by them throughout their li~etime.
Moreover, the State Engineer did not timely raise the question
of another action pending in his Answer. We have discussed
the other questions raised by defendant, State Engineer. In an
Answer to the Brief of the United States, et al., and the Brief
of the Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., and shall
not enlarge upon what is there said.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FILED A NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL AND THEY RELY UPON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER
A DECREE WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THE CONTRACTS FOR WATER DELIVERABLE THROUGH THE
HIGH LINE CANAL ARE CHARGEABLE WITH ALL
THE WATER THEY USE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RETAINING JURISDICTION OF THIS CAUSE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN
YEARS.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TORENDER A DECREE WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THE CONTRACTS FOR WATER DELIVERABLE THOUGH THE
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HIGH LINE CANAL ARE CHARGEABLE WITH ALL THE
WATER THEY USE.
It will be seen that there are a great number of Exhibits
which were reueived in evidence. During the trial we were dt
a loss to understand upon which possible the9ry many of the
Exhibits were competent. The issues raised by the pleading~
were confined to the construction that should be placed ~n
the various Contracts for the sale of water under the Federal
Strawberry Project, and such other Contracts as were entered
into by the United States Government and the Corporations
that were to distribute the water right applied for to the
persons entitled thereto. It would seem to need no argument
to convince this Court that contracts are made to be carried
out according to the intention of the parties thereto as shown
by the language used. It is when, and only when, the language
~ used in a contract is ambiguous or uncertain that resort may
.be had to construction. If the language of a contract is certain
and definite, there is nothing to construe. 12 Am. fur. 228,
and cases cited in footnotes. We have heretofore discussed the
·meaning of the Contracts here involved and shall not enlarge
upon what is there said.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RETAINING JURISDICTION OF THIS CAUSE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN
YEARS.
The project here involved had been in operation for a
period of 44 years prior to the time of the trial. Water was first
· delivered in 1913. See Defendants' Exhibit 73. Complete
records were kept of the water available to supply those who
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had purchased water from the United States during all of that
period. If that is not a sufficient time to ·ascertain all relevant
facts, an additional ten years cannot accomplish that purpose.
Moreover, the meaning of the various Contracts here involved
will not change in an additional ten years, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court of the United States is accused of changing
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. In the
course of an additional ten years it is more than likely that
a number of us who have taken part in this litigation will have
passed to the Great Beyond, and any evidence that may be now
available will be gone. Further, as to that. The cost of this
litigation, which is incurred by the Strawberry Water Users
Association Users Association, many of whom are the owners
of only stored water, and as such are interested in having the
users of river water charged with all the water they use from
that source.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs herein claim that all those who use project
water, whether it be river water or stored water, should be
charged with all of the water used. That such is the · clear
meaning of the Contracts here involved, and that a Final Decree
should be entered herein at this time to avoid needless further
delay, and to put an end to further litigation.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN,

Attorney for Plaintiffs,
Respondents and Cross-Appellants
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